报告题目：Endogenously Uninformed: Evidence from Comment Letters in China
时间：2026年5月9日 下午3:00
地点：北京理工大学主楼 216
报告人：胡宁
报告人国籍：中国
报告人政治面貌：中共党员
报告人职务：现代审计研究所所长
报告人职称：教授、博士生导师
报告人工作单位：西南财经大学会计学院
报告人简介：
胡宁，2019年毕业于上海财经大学，2020年晋升副教授（破格），2023年获长期教职并遴选为博士生导师（破格），2024年晋升教授（破格），主持国家自然科学基金青年项目和面上项目各一项，担任现代审计研究所所长，光华会计拔尖人才，中国会计学会副秘书长（挂职），四川省注协人才工作委员会副主任委员，《China Journal of Accounting Research》青年编委。在人民日报出版社出版专著《选择性监管及其经济后果研究——基于沪深交易所年报问询函的证据》，以第一作者或通讯作者在《Journal of Accounting and Public Policy》、《Journal of Business Finance and Accounting》、《Accounting Horizions》、《Energy Economics》、《Regulation & Governance》、《Corporate Governance: An International Review》、《会计研究》、《南开管理评论》等期刊发表论文数篇。
报告内容简介：
We examine how regulatory comment letters (CLs) affect investors’ information acquisition in the Chinese capital market. In China, regulators prefer to address minor issues through private outreach and issue public CLs only when concerns are more serious, making CLs function more as a deterrent sanction rather than a communication mechanism as commonly perceived in the United States. Using investor inquiries on an investor interactive platform (IIP) as a direct measure of information acquisition, we find that the disclosure of CLs leads to a significant decline in subsequent investor information acquisition. This reduction persists for up to 24 months, leaving the market persistently uninformed about the negative information signaled by the CLs. Consistent with a deterrence interpretation, the effect is stronger for more severe CLs and weakens when short-selling constraints are relaxed. Additional evidence from institutional site visits and online search activity suggests that the decline in information acquisition extends beyond the IIP channel. We further show that this reduction in information production is associated with lower liquidity and weaker price informativeness. Overall, our findings suggest that the way comment letters are implemented can unintentionally shape their capital-market consequences.
（承办：会计系、科研与学术交流中心）
